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Articles
Brenda Hoggett* Recent Reforms in Family Law:
Progress or backlash?
My qualifications for delivering this lecture in honour of the late Horace
E. Read are questionable. As an English academic family lawyer, I
cannot claim an interest in the substantive areas of law which most
interested him. As a member of the English Law Commission, however,
I can claim an interest in legislation and the legislative process and
Horace Read is perhaps best known outside North America for his
pioneering work on the teaching of methods of making and applying
legislation, including of course his Cases and Materials on Legislation. I
should like, therefore, to offer him some thoughts on the process of
legislating for reform in family law, with particular reference to recent
events in England. They may, I fear, be somewhat uncomfortable
thoughts, as they are prompted by the expectations apparently
engendered in some quarters by my appointment as the first woman Law
Commissioner for England and Wales.' If the law were indeed a rational
science, operating against the background of some generally approved
and coherent theory of justice, then the sex of a law reformer should
make no difference to her consideration of whether a particular law is
unjust and how it should be changed. But of course the law is not rational
in that way and to some it may seem self-evident that a woman will have
a different perspective upon law reform, perhaps particularly in the field
of family law.
2
Mary Ann Glendon has described the transition taking place in family
law throughout the developed Western world.3 Theoretically it is little
short of a revolution: the law no longer seeks to define and enforce a
particular concept of marriage and the family, but rather to tolerate a
wide diversity of living arrangements, and then to offer protection and
adjustment when things go wrong.4 In England, much of that revolution
*This article contains the text of the twelfth Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture delivered at
Dalhousie Law School, October 20, 1986. The author is a Commissioner of the English Law
Commission and Professor, Manchester University.
1. See comments in eg. the Daily Star 15.2.84.
2. One academic commentator on Law Com. No. 103, The Financial Consequences of
Divorce - A Discussion Paper (1980) added the postscript "Why are there no women Law
Commissioners?!"
3. State Law and Family(1977).
4. I have described the evolution of English family law in "Families and the Law" in R.N.
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is the work of the Law Commission. The Commission was established in
1965 with the ostensible function of keeping under review "all the law
... with a view to its systematic development and reform ' 5 but with the
actual expectation that it would concentrate upon "lawyers' law". Its
architects assumed that it would keep out of the law administered by
Government Departments6, while the White Paper preceding the Law
Commissions Act did not envisage that it would do everything itself. In
particular "where important social questions may arise" it might be more
appropriate to refer them to a Departmental Committee or Royal
Commission. 7 The Commission's first programme8 of law reform
proposed a preliminary examination of three areas: (a) "matrimonial
law" in the light of the mixed reactions to the Report of the Royal
Commission on Marriage and Divorce9 - this was the "code" for reform
of the grounds for divorce; (b) family inheritance and property law; and
(c) jurisdiction in family matters. This examination was intended to lead
to proposals as to the agencies to which these topics should be referred.
In fact, the Commission undertook the first two itself and thus plunged
immediately into questions of enormous social importance. In 1968 its
second programme expanded them into "a comprehensive examination
of family law ... with a view to its systematic reform and eventual
codification". 10 This was approved by the then Lord Chancellor" and the
Commission has been working on it ever since. In that time it has
produced 20 Working Papers and 24 Reports on family law matters. Of
the latter, 18 have been implemented in full, two are accepted and
awaiting legislation, two did not call for legislation, and only two have
been rejected or forgotten. Indeed, although codification may still be a
long way off,12 the Commission has probably had more success in family
law than in any other field.
The Law Commission reports to the Lord Chancellor, but the decision
on whether to implement any particular report is made by the
Government Department responsible for that area of law. It so happens
that family law (apart from child care law) is the responsibility of the
Rapoport, M.P. Fogarty and R. Rapoport (eds), Families in Britian (1982); see also J.M.
Eekelaar, Family Law and Social Policy 2nd ed. (1984).
5. Law Commissions Act 1965, s. 3(i).
6. G. Gardiner and A. Martin (eds), Law Reform Now (1963), p.9.
7. Proposalsfor English and Scottish Law Commissions, Cmd. 2573 (1965), p.2 .
8. Law Commissions Act 1965. First Programme of the Law Commission, Law Com. No. I
(1965), Item X.
9. (The Morton Commission) Cmd. 9678 (1956).
10. The Law Commission. Second Programme of Law Reform, Law Com. No. 14 (1968),
Item XIX.
11. Lord Gardiner.
12. See S.M. Cretney, "The Codification of Family Law" (1981) 44 M.L.R. 1.
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Lord Chancellor's Department and the Lord Chancellor has a
commendable record of accepting and implementing the Commission's
Reports in this area. From his point of view, the standing and
independence of the Law Commission are important factors in gaining
Parliamentary approval for proposals with which he agrees. It enables
him, quite correctly, to say that the matter has been exhaustively
investigated by an eminent body which is independent both of
Government and of party politics and thus that our recommendations
may fairly be presented as non-controversial (or at least non-deserving of
controversy). This technique was markedly successful with the recent
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 198413 which implemented
three Law Commission Reports. 14 Two of these were in fact highly
controversial in certain quarters: permitting divorce after one rather than
three years of marriage proved unpopular with the Bishops in the House
of Lords, while amending the law on financial provision and property
adjustment after divorce had provoked enormous controversy outside
Parliament. Yet both emerged virtually unscathed.
In reflecting on this, we must bear in mind the characteristics of the
Law Commission. It usually consists of a High Court Judge, a Q.C. from
practice, a solicitor from practice and two academic lawyers. Until my
appointment, all were men. Its staff are lawyers (not all men). It has no
capacity to conduct or finance large-scale empirical research, although it
may occasionally stimulate others to do so and can encourage or conduct
smaller projects.15 It consults as widely as it can, but often much more
successfully within the legal profession and formal bodies such as the
Building Societies Association than elsewhere. There may also be a
tendency both in the Law Commission and in the Lord Chancellor's
Department to pay more attention to lawyers' views than to some others.
This is perfectly understandable in any Government Department which
depends upon cooperation with certain professions or occupational
groups for the smooth running of whatever it has to run. The Lord
Chancellor's Department cannot manage the courts without maintaining
reasonable relations with the judges and the legal professions, just as the
Department of Health and Social Security cannot mastermind the social
services without the cooperation of local government, directors of social
services and even the social workers on the ground. The conservatism of
13. Hansard(H.L.), vol.445, cols.29, 31-32,21 December 1983.
14. Time Restrictions on Presentation of Divorce and Nullity Petitions, Law Com. No. 116
(1982); The Financial Consequences of Divorce, Law Com. No. 112 (1982); Financial Relief
after Foreign Divorce, Law Com. No. 117(1982).
15. The only large scale research relevant to family law and undertaken at the instance of the
Commission is J. Todd and L. Jones (O.P.C.S.), MatrimonialProperty (1972).
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the legal profession has been identified by our present Lord Chancellor as
one of the "obstacles to law reform". 16 He has also been known to quote
Lord Campbell's aphorism that "law reform is only by consent or not at
all". 17 It is fair, I think, to ask "by whose consent?"
The obvious answer is that, whatever else may be required, the support
of a substantial body of legal opinion has been essential for any change
in family law over the past two decades and probably for much longer.
Indeed, it is curious that the Law Commission has been allowed to play
such a large part in shaping reform of an area raising such important
social, moral and micro-political issues that non-lawyers would not
normally term it "lawyers' law". But for present purposes the interesting
question is how far the fact that these issues have been defined and
discussed by lawyers, usually male lawyers, has influenced the outcome.
The question could probably be answered by reference to any branch of
family law, but space does not permit me to cover the whole field.
Instead, I shall consider the rise and fall of the concept of marital
partnership in English law.
Carol Smart has remarked how "during the 1950's there was a belief
that full legal equality had almost been achieved" 18 between the sexes.
She cites Lord Justice Denning's address to the National Marriage
Guidance Council in 1950, in which he commented that "the fact that
women have gained equality with men has tremendous potentialities for
civilisation, but whether it is for good or bad is yet to be seen". He went
on to suggest that a wife was now the "spoilt darling" of the law and her
husband the "patient packhorse". 19 Similarly, the first edition of
Bromley's Family Law, like the current one, asserted that "during the past
century the wife's position has steadily changed from something in many
respects inferior to that of a servant (who could at least quit her master's
service by giving notice) to that of the joint, co-equal head of the
family".20 As Smart comments, it is difficult to understand how lawyers
could possibly have arrived at this conclusion, save in the light of the
dismantling of the grossly discriminatory provisions of the common law
of marriage. They seem to have been unaware of the extent of the
remaining legal, social and especially economic disadvantages suffered by
women and assumed that formal equality of opportunity to own property
was the same as substantive equality.
16. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, "Obstacles to Law Reform" [19011 Current Legal
Problems 279.
17. Id. at 281; see also Hansard (H.L.), vol.462. col.604, 16 April 1985.
18. The Ties that Bind - Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal Relations
(1984), p. 2 9.
19. As reported in The Times for 13.5.1950.
20. (1957). See 6th edn. (1981), p.109.
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However, that view changed quite substantially during the 1950's and
1960's. Three men may be singled out as particularly influential in
bringing this about, but their reasons for doing so are instructive.
The first was Lord Denning himself. As is well known, it was he who
invented the "deserted wife's equity"21 and who interpreted the Married
Women's Property Act 1882, which had established the principle of
separate property, so as to give the courts a wide discretion to interfere in
the rights which separate property would otherwise have entailed. 22 Both
inventions were ultimately denied patents by the House of Lords,23 but
they undoubtedly alerted legal opinion to the problems faced by wives in
keeping their homes when their marriages broke up. It has, for example,
been suggested that one cause of the great increase in joint legal
ownership of the matrimonial home is the advice of solicitors wishing to
guard against such litigation.24 Yet Lord Denning's championship was
clearly designed for the traditionally "good wife" who stayed at home,
looked after the family, and committed no misconduct. As he said in
Gurasz v. Gurasz:25 "Some features of family life are elemental in our
society. One is that it is the husband's duty to provide his wife with a roof
over her head, and the children too. So long as the wife behaves herself,
she is entitled to remain in the matrimonial home. The husband is not at
liberty to turn her out of it, neither by virtue of his command, nor by
force of his conduct."
The second was Professor Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, who spent a long
academic life advocating some form of community of property in English
law. He was, of course, influenced by his background in the civil law. His
arguments relied heavily upon the notion that "the inequality of the sexes
dictated by nature imposes a necessary inequality" 26 in economic terms.
If, therefore, the law was to live up to the rhetoric of equality which was
then being voiced, it would have to do something to redress that "natural
inequality". The notion that this was natural was shared by sociologists
of the time. Most notably, of course, Talcott Parsons developed the
theory that the separation between the activities of the male breadwinner
and of the female homemaker was highly functional in meeting the needs
21. Bendallv.McWhirter[1952]2 Q.B..466.
22. Hinev.Hine[1962] 1 W.L.R. 1124.
23. Respectively, National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965]A.C.1165; Pettitt v. Pettitt
[1970] A.C.777.
24. Todd and Jones, op.cit, at p.83.
25. [1970] p.11, at p. 16.
26. "Matrimonial Property and Equality before the Law: Some Sceptical Reflections" (1971)
4 Human Rights Journal 493 at p.504; see also in W. Friedman (ed.), Matrimonial Property
Law (1955); and Matrimonial Property - Where do we go from here? Josef Ungar Memorial
Lecture, University of Birmingham (1971).
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both of the world of work and of the family members. The occupational
structure in modern industrialised societies requires mobile workers who
are able to compete as individuals untrammelled by personal
considerations, but from a secure and comfortable home base with the
warm emotional climate required by all, including the children.
27
The view that this division of roles is not only natural but also useful
could be developed into a rather different sort of argument for
community of property. The third and in many ways most influential
English lawyer on this subject is Lord Simon of Glaisdale, who while at
the Bar submitted evidence to the Royal Commission on Marriage and
Divorce,28 as President of the Family Division delivered lectures on the
subject,29 and in the House of Lords has promoted legislation about it. He
has been the most articulate supporter of the view that the wife's
domestic efforts make a positive economic contribution to the acquisition
of the family's property. That contribution is usually seen in Parsonian
terms, as freeing the man to go out and get the property in. In Simon's
well known phrase, "the cock bird can feather his nest precisely because
he is not required to spend most of his time sitting on it".30
This concept can be developed in several ways - from the simple
point that an efficient worker needs to be comfortably housed and fed,
through the more positive contribution made by the wife's encourage-
ment and support, including such tangible efforts as entertaining business
associates or superiors, to the yet more obvious and extensive
participation, for example of vicars' wives31 and those who help their
husbands in farms and small businesses.
32
There cannot be much doubt that the perception of housework as
having a true economic value, pioneered in the United Kingdom by Lord
Simon, was crucially important in persuading lawyers of the justice of a
concept of sharing or partnership in family assets. A good illustration is
27. T. Parsons, Family, Socialisation and the Interaction Process (1956).
28. Minutes of Evidence, Paper No. 22; for the Commission's Report, see Cmd. 9678 (1956);
the discussion of matrimonial property is at paras. 625 etseq.; 12 members of the Commission
were against community of property but 7 (including 4 out of the 5 female members) were in
favour, all fully endorsed the "concept of partnership" in which the wife's contribution to the
undertaking was 'just as valuable" as that of the husband (para.644). Simon's advocacy was
based, not only on "inherent equity" and "the economic value of the housewife", but also on
the belief that advancing her economic status would indirectly facilitate the introduction of
equal pay.
29. With all my Worldly Goods, University of Birmingham, Holdsworth Club Presidential
Address (1964); Recent Developments in the MatrimonialLaw, Riddell Lecture (1970).
30. With all my Worldly Goods (1964), p.14.
31. J. Finch, Married to the Job: Wives'Incorporation in Men's Work (1983).
32. Whose work was eventually recognised as a contribution in money or money's worth; see
Nixon v. Nixon [1969] 3 All E.R. 1133.
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the judgement of Woodhouse J. in the New Zealand case of Aitken v.
Aitken33: the wife had made "consistent and important contributions to
the acquisition of the various assets ... by complementing (her
husband's) capacities with her own. She gave him the essential support he
needed ... by her success in managing their home as an efficient and
provident housewife and mother ... and by providing the base that left
him free to win the family income.., and attend to the investment of
their substantial savings." Significantly, New Zealand has since legislated
for the sharing of family assets in a way which relies heavily on this
notion of contributions.
34
All of these ideas concentrate upon the ways in which the wife helps
her husband to earn or make money. They rely upon a notion of
"separate but equal" contributions to a marital partnership which should
be regarded as such in law as well as fact. They owe little to modem
feminism. This is usually dated from Betty Friedan's realisati6n in 1963
that women were not always happy or fulfilled in their so-called natural
role,35 leading on to the expositions of the extent of male domination by
authors such as Kate Millett36 and Germaine Greer in 1971. 37 Still later
came Ann Oakley's work on housewives, 38 which attacks not only the
Parsonian view but also the comfortable assumption that those sex roles
were indeed breaking down as the family became more "symmetrical". 39
Their work may, however, have contributed something to a rather
different perception of the value of the wife's work. Not only may she
contribute to the husband's earning power, but also to the accumulation
of a surplus out of that earning power, and therefore to the acquisition of
the property bought with that surplus. She may do so simply by efficient
management and spending the money wisely; or she may do so by adding
value to what is bought, whether through making her own curtains and
clothes for the children or through wielding the sledgehammer or cement
mixer.40 Alternatively, it can be pointed out that such services have a
clear economic value if they are bought and sold in the market place and
33. Quoted by K. Gray, Reallocation of Property on Divorce (1977); similar views were
expressed in Hofman v. Hofman [1965] N.Z.L.R.795 and Haldane v. Haldane [1975] 1
N.Z.L.R.672; sympathy for them as expressed by Lord Morris in Pettiti v. Pettilt [1970]
A.C.777, at p.802. Sir Owen Woodhouse is now the first Chairman of the New Zealand Law
Commission.
34. Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s.18.
35. The Feminine Mystique (1963).
36. Sexual Politics (first published in U.K. in 1971).
37. TheFemale Eunuch (1971).
38. Housewife (1974) and The Sociology of Housework (1974).
39. See M. Young and P. Willmott, The SymmetricalFamily (1973).
40. Also now recognized as a contribution in money or money's worth; see Cooke v. Head
[1972] 2 All E.R.38; Eves v. Eves [1975] 3 All E.R.768.
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that, if she were not there to perform them free of charge, her husband
would have to pay for them.
41
Some concept of marital partnership has gained wide recognition in
the developed common law world. All the Canadian Provinces have, of
course, legislated for the sharing of marital property on divorce, although
the many differences between them may indicate the variety of rationales
which have been advanced. In the United Kingdom, however,
acceptance of the concept, and in particular its economic dimension, has
been more limited and more fragile. By the end of the 1960's, Lord
Denning's adventurous interpretation of the courts' powers under the
Married Women's Property Act had been rejected by the House of Lords,
with a return to the emphasis on contributions in money or money's
worth, only a limited acceptance of the concept of an indirect
contribution, and an insistence that contributions be quantified in place of
the maxim "equality is equity".42 Further development was therefore
dependent upon Parliament and the Law Commission.
In 1966, the Law Commission joined the Church43 in supporting
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. One
argument was that dead marriages should be decently buried so that
many "stable illicit unions" and their offspring could be regularised. 4
This support was crucial in bringing about the so-called "no fault"
Divorce Reform Act of 1969. Nevertheless, there was great concern
about the prejudice to wives, especially those divorced against their will
in later life. The House of Commons went so far as to give a Second
Reading to Mr. Edward Bishop's Matrimonial Property Bill which would
have introduced community of property during marriage. This may be
seen as the high point of the idea of matrimonial partnership in English
law. It was withdrawn in anticipation of the Law Commission's
recommendations on the financial consequences of divorce.45
The resulting legislation, 46 of course, dealt only with the position where
the marriage had irretrievably broken down and relied upon
discretionary powers in the courts. Nevertheless, there were at least three
41. This has long been recognised in the husband's action per quod consortium amisit
(abolished in 1982) or under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
42. Gissingv. Gissing[1971]A.C.886.
43. Putting Asunder - A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society, Report of a Group
appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury (1966).
44. Reform of the Grounds of Divorce - The Field of Choice, Law Com. No.6 (1966),
paras.25(h) and 33-37.
45. The Financial Consequences of Divorce, Law Com. No.25 (1969); the Bishop Bill is
printed as Appendix 11 to the Commission's Working Paper on Family Property Law, P.WP.
No. 42 (1971).
46. Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970; since consolidated with divorce
legislation as Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
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important changes and these can undoubtedly be seen as the price which
husbands (and others) had to pay for the acceptance of no-fault divorce.47
First, instead of the husband having to maintain his wife, all the court's
powers were fully reciprocal, so that all the assets and income of each
could be considered together and notionally "pooled". Second, the courts
were given powers to adjust any of their property rights and to make
substantial lump sum orders as well as periodical payments. Property
adjustment and financial provision could be considered together as part
of a global settlement. Third, they were specifically directed to take into
account the parties' contributions to the welfare of a family, including
those made by looking after the home or caring for the family.
48
Interestingly, the concept was one of contribution to the family's welfare
rather than to its assets. The objective given to the courts in exercising
these powers was to place the parties in the positions in which they would
have been had the marriage not broken down.
In 1973, the leading case of Wachtel v. Wachte49 turned these new
powers into something remarkably like deferred community of property.
First, Lord Simon's point about the cock feathering the nest was
accepted; henceforth a wife should normally be entitled to share in the
assets as well as the income, although these were limited to so-called
"family assets". Second, the parties' conduct should not normally affect
this; if there is a real partnership between them and their assets are
notionally pooled, then these should be shared out equally and their
conduct should only affect this if one is much more than 50% to blame.
This was a significant advance upon the previous approach, for if the
assets are regarded as the husband's alone, then the wife's claim to be
maintained might be cut down by the extent to which she was less than
100% innocent.50 Third, however, if there was a claim for both capital
and income, she should only have one third of each; she could not
dissolve the partnership for the purposes of distributing the assets while
continuing to make demands upon it for the purpose of future income.
This decision was regarded as a great advance for women, yet for some
it did not go far enough. The statutory objective of placing them both in
the positions in which they would have been had the marriage not broken
down was of course unobtainable; but it might at least have secured an
equal standard of living, on the footing that had the marriage not broken
down they would have continued to share the same standard. A division
47. A point put to the Commission by a distinguished judge specialising in family matters
during the more recent consultation on financial consequences.
48. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.25(2) () (as it now is).
49. (1973] Fam.72.
50. See'Ackerman v. Ackerman [1972] Fam.225.
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which gives him twice as much capital and income as her is not on the
face of it equal. 5' In any event, in most cases the Wachtel approach
proved impracticable, as there was not enough money or property to
achieve it, and the courts had to concentrate upon seeing that the basic
housing and income needs of the parties and their children were met.
5 2
The end result, save for very wealthy families, was that the courts did
indeed attempt to achieve roughly equal standards of living for the parties
at the point of initial distribution.5 3 The obvious effect of this, of course,
was that husbands began to feel a sense of grievance. The division of roles
within the family, coupled with the continuing disadvantages of women
in the employment field, inevitably meant that if the court attempted to
redress the balance at the end of the marriage it would have to take a
great deal away from the husband. He, after all, still had his earning
power unimpaired, would have better prospects of borrowing for
housing, and could look forward to a State or occupational pension for
as long as he lived. The wife, whether or not she still had the children to
look after, would rarely have any of these things. Compensating her
necessarily affected the husband's ability to start afresh with a new
family. The price which had originally been paid for increasing the
possibilities of re-marriage now came under attack for making it more
expensive. The Campaign of Justice in Divorce was formed; two thirds
of its members were divorced husbands and one-third were second
wives. 4
Before turning to the outcome of this campaign we should notice the
fate of proposals to redress the "natural inequality" during marriage.
Apart from the intervention of the State, in the form of child benefit, the
only mitigation of the strict separate property regime until the marriage
ends by death or divorce is the Married Women's Property Act 1964,
giving the wife a half share in the savings from any housekeeping
allowance. Following reform of the divorce law, the Law Commission
turned its attention to family property. A Working Paper in 197155
canvassed many ideas, including full and deferred community of
property, co-ownership of the matrimonial home and protection for
household goods, and fixed inheritance rights. In 1973, significantly the
same year as the Wachtel decision, the first Report on Family Property
51. Ormrod J. at first instance had awarded her roughly half of both capital and income.
52. Browne v. Pritchard 1975] 3 All E.R. 721; Scott v. Scott 8197913 All E.R.65.
53. See J.M. Eekelaar, "Some Principles of Financial and Property Adjustment on Divorce"
(1979) 95 Law Quarterly Review 253; see also R. Deech, "Financial Relief; the Retreat from
Precedent and Principle" (1982) 98 L.Q.R.621.
54. See J.R. Allan and R.D.J. Home, The Financial Anatomy of Post-Divorce Man, CJ.D.
(1980), p.1.
55. Family Property Law, P.WP. No.42 (1971).
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stated that "the principle of co-ownership of the matrimonial home is
widely supported both as the best means of reforming the law relating to
the home, and as the main principle of family property law. The great
majorty who supported co-ownership included legal practitioners,
academic lawyers, women's organisations and members of the public.
Those who oppose co-ownership were those who were opposed to any
form of fixed property rights, and they were relatively few in number." 56
This approval was supported by the social survey of the attitudes of
married couples, commissioned at the same time: 91% of husbands and
94% of wives agreed that the home and its contents should legally be
jointly owned by husband and wife irrespective of who paid for them;
87% of both husbands and wives in couples where the home was owned
by only one of them nevertheless regarded it as belonging to them both.
57
The Report accordingly recommended acceptance of the principle of co-
ownership of the matrimonial home, though no further extension of
community of property, and the staff went away to work out the
conveyancing implications.
In the early 1970's, the climate of opinion was sympathetic to
legislation on women's rights. The seminal literature of modem feminism
dates mainly from then. The same period saw a spate of legislation,
usually with all party support. The Equal Pay Act had been passed in
1970, the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975, and legislation to protect the
victims of rape from publicity and irrelevant cross-examination 8 and to
improve the remedies for domestic violence 9 in 1976. Interestingly, that
last was not the work of the Law Commission, but of a back bench
Member of Parliament who is a noted feminist. The last important
advance was in maternity rights in 1978. But by the time the Commission
produced its detailed Report on co-ownership, also in 1978,60 the climate
of opinion was changing. A radical new Conservative Government (with
a woman Prime Minister) was elected in 1979. In 1980, Lord Simon
introduced the Law Commission's draft Bill in the House of Lords,
supported by Lord Scarman, the Commission's first Chairman. It is
interesting, however, that Lord Scarman's support was based, not on the
concept of an economic partnership in marriage, but almost on the
reverse: the need to protect "an absolutely darling person of great virtue"
from "her own inexperience in the wiles of the world". The Bill
represented "the laws safety net for the most vulnerable women in our
56. First Report on Family Property - A New Approach, Law Com. No. 52 (1973), para.21.
57. Todd and Jones, op.cit, at pp. 11 and 38.
58. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976.
59. Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976.
60. Third Report on Family Property - The Matrimonial Home (Co-ownership and
Occupation Rights) andHousehold Goods, Law Com. No.86 (1978).
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society, the devoted married women while the marriage relationship is a
living relationship and she has her family duties hard upon her."61 This is
a far cry from giving economic effect to an equal contribution to the
marital enterprise. In any event, the Lord Chancellor made it clear that
the Bill would not receive Government support and the same happened
more recently when the Law Commission reiterated these proposals in
1982.62
Meanwhile,, attention had turned to an attack upon the principle of
continuing spousal support following divorce. Of course, there is one
strand of feminism which dislikes the whole idea of dependent women
and sees the concept of maintenance both during and after the marriage
as not only the reflection of that dependence but also a contributing
factor to its cause. If women are to be truly equal they must take
advantage of their opportunities in the world outside the home and cease
to look upon men and marriage as their security and support.63 Other
feminists, influenced by the extent of the continuing inequality both at
home and at work, have argued that it is quite unrealistic and unjust to
abandon the principle of support when so few women can reasonably be
expected to support themselves.64 The latter school would not suggest
that maintenance should be available for women who can support
themselves; but it should not readily be assumed that this is practicable
until there have been more positive attempts to redress the disadvantages
which women suffer from in competing in the outside world. In the
absence of these, any move to encourage "self-sufficiency" by withdrawal
of such limited spousal support as there is is likely simply to increase the
pressure on women to remarry, which in turn may increase pressure on
their new partners to decrease their commitment to previous
relationships, thus perpetuating a cycle of dependence.
65
Both strands of feminism are largely concerned with how best to
advance the position of women in the outside world. The political
campaign owed little to either. An all-party Divorce Law Reform Group
was formed, apparently more troubled by the rising divorce rate and the
fate of the children involved, than by the alleged injustice of the financial
consequences. 66 In some quarters there may even be regret at divorce
61. Hansard(H.L.), vol.405, cols.130, 128.
62. Property Law - The Implications of William's and Glyn's Bank Ltd v. Boland Law Corn.
No. 115 (1982).
63. See R. Deech, "The Principles of Maintenance" (1977) Family Law 229.
64. See K. O'Donovan, "The Principles of Maintenance - An Alternative View" (1978) 8
Family Law 180.
65. See e-g. C. Smart, op.cit
66. 206 M.Ps. signed a Motion on 21 July 1981 calling for action on children, conciliation
and financial provision.
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reforms which have made it rather easier for women to escape from
relationships which they find intolerable 67 and the financial consequences
which can be part of that. The Campaign for Justice in Divorce,
however, was largely responsible for building up the pressure for reform.
Interestingly, in view of the history of the 1969 reforms, a major part
of their argument relied upon the concept of no-fault divorce. It was
suggested that maintenance originally developed on the analogy of
damages for breach of contract; in other words, that it was the price the
husband had to pay for having broken his matrimonial obligations. Once
the law had abandoned the concept of breach of matrimonial obligations
for the purpose of granting a divorce, it was argued, it was illogical to
retain it for the purpose of continuing support. This argument seems
misconceived. The obligation to maintain stems from the marriage itself,
not the divorce. Even at common law, it did not depend upon showing
fault on the husband's part, for it persisted in cases of separation which
were the fault of neither,68 although it could be reduced or even
extinguished by fault in the wife. Its continuation after divorce can be
justified on the ground that the marriage has had lasting effects upon the
ability of the recipient to support herself.69 Be that as it may, the view
seems to have developed on both sides of the Atlantic70 that there is some
sort of inevitable link between no-fault divorce and the so-called "clean
break".
However, the proponents of marital partnership may also support a
clean break.71 The full partnership analogy could suggest that you cannot
dissolve a partnership for one purpose and keep it alive for another.
Elsewhere in the common law world 72 there has been a growing trend to
legislate for fair (not necessarily equal) division of family (not necessarily
all) assets and to deal quite separately with future spousal support, which
may only be awarded in limited circumstances, for example where there
are dependent children or continuing need resulting from the marriage.
The Scots have recently adopted a system along these lines.73
Interestingly they did not seek to justify their norm of "fair sharing of
67. See eg. The Society of Conservative Lawyers, The Future of Marriage - A Report by
a Research Sub-Committee (1981).
68. Brannan v. Brannan [1973] Fam.120.
69. This view was frequently expressed in response to the Law Commission's Discussion
Paper on the Financial Consequences of Divorce, Law Com. No.103 (1980).
70. See L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (1985), ch.2.
71. See esp. Gray, op.cit., ch.6.
72. E.g. in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, other countries do not share the Canadian
problem that divorce and attendant financial provision are federal and property division is
provincial, but the approach in substance is similar, the approach in West Germany is also
much the same as that outlined here.
73. Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
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matrimonial property" on the basis of economic contributions, but rather
on the idea of equality in marriage, for which there was considerable
public support.74 They did, however, add the norm of "fair recognition of
the economic contributions and disadvantages" flowing from the
marriage, which will encompass the negative "contribution" made by the
wife who compromises her job prospects and rewards for the sale of her
husband and family. The notion of positive economic contributions is
treated with some scepticism. For one thing, there is no link between the
amount of work a housewife does and the extent of her husband's
enrichment; the richer he is, indeed, the less work she is likely to do.75
This looks like a return to the concepts of the 1950's and 1960's, but
without the fall-back of continuing maintenance, which has always been
alien to the Scottish tradition. At the same time, the Scots have
recommended against co-ownership of the matrimonial home during
marriage.76
South of the border, the inter-relationship between the abandonment
of continuing spousal support claims (the meal-ticket for life) and the
equal or at least fair distribution of family assets seems to have been
completely lost from view. The Law Commission decided that there was
so much concern that further work on the grounds for divorce should be
postponed in favour of a discussion paper on the financial consequences
of divorce.77 This was followed by a paper reporting on the response to
that discussion paper, but without a draft Bill attached.78 Nevertheless,
the proposals of the Commission were accepted and a Bill drafted. 79
Clearly this whole debate was about maintenance and not about the
sharing of family assets. The resulting changes appeared minor, in that
they did away with some artificial restrictions upon the clean break and
encouraged the courts to consider it wherever possible. 0 Much concern
was voiced on behalf of, especially, middle-aged women who might not
be able to adjust to self-sufficiency and much reassurance was given that
there was no real risk that the courts would alter their practice.8 '
Almost unnoticed was the possible effect of the new law upon the
distribution of property. It was often assumed that, because the statutory
objective (of placing the parties in the position in which they would have
74. Scottish Law Commission, Report on Aliment and Financial Provision, Scot. Law Com.
No.67, paras. 3.65-3.68.
75. ld para. 3.93.
76. Scottish Law Commission, Report on Matrimonial Property, Scot. Law Com. No.86
(1984).
77. Law Com. No. 103 (1980).
78. Law Com. No. 112 (1981).
79. Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, Pt.II.
80. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.25A.
81. E.g. by the Lord Chancellor, Hansard (H.L.), vol. 445, col.34.
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been had the marriage not broken down) was unattainable, it inevitably
served no useful purpose. However, it did serve as an exhortation to
produce equality of result, at least at the point when the marriage broke
down, and that in itself was some encouragement towards an equal
sharing of assets. The objective was repealed but nothing was put in its
place, apart from the need to give first consideration to the welfare of the
minor children of the family.82 The new principles apply to property
adjustment just as much to periodical payments, so that there is now no
principle of equality and nothing to encourage fair shares. Coupled with
the rejection of any form of co-ownership it looks very much as though
the concept of marital partnership has now been abandoned. Certainly,
the results of our own consultations into possible extensions of the
Married Women's Property Act 196483 do not suggest that there is any
longer widespread support within the legal community for even a limited
extension of automatic sharing of property during marriage.
This is not to say that equal sharing coupled with restricted
maintenance is itself the right answer. Women, especially those with
dependent children, may fare better under our system than elsewhere.84
But it does reveal a very considerable retreat from the ideas underpinning
the original legislation - indeed, in one respect those ideas have been
stood on their heads to produce the opposite of what was originally
intended. Whether or not it is progress, it is certainly a backlash.
What can have caused it? Perhaps it is that many in the legal
community could be persuaded of the injustice to good wives and
mothers when that was so very apparent, as it was during the 1950's and
1960's. Good wives and mothers are of benefit to their husbands as well
as to their children. Their financial position is almost inevitably altered
for the worse by marriage. Once, however, there is a real attempt to
redress that injustice, enthusiasm wanes, as it becomes clear how much it
will cost to do so.
Added to this is the increased visibility of those few women who have
been able to take advantage of the growing equality of opportunity. The
true extent of the remaining inequality of result can easily be forgotten
unless there are frequent reminders. Women themselves have difficulty in
identifying a single "women's point of view" on these issues. While
perhaps a minority would subscribe to the most extreme call for the
abolition of maintenance, most would support its withdrawal where self-
82. Now Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.25(1).
83. Transfer of Money between Spouses - The Married Women's Property Act 1984, W.P.
No.90 (1985).
84. cf Weitzman, op.cit; the Campaign for Justice in Divorce was not wholly delighted with
the new legislation.
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sufficiency can reasonably be expected, and a surprising number accept
that wives should only be compensated for specific marriage-related
disadvantage and not for the general disadvantage suffered by all women
in the world outside the home.85 Leaving aside the difficulty of
distinguishing the two, the latter is crucially related to the perceived need
to enable men to work to support their families.86 Hence all women lose
from the expectations engendered by traditional marriage just as all men
gain from them.
A further difficulty is that those few women who have indeed gained
equality of result not only exemplify the view that equality of opportunity
is now enough but also tend to share it. For the last seven years, the
political climate has been in favour of equality of opportunity and against
equality of result. Women who have succeeded in gaining entry to the
men's world, whether in the law or in politics, have usually done so by
adopting a male career pattern and attitudes. It is not, therefore,
necessarily to be expected that a woman Law Commissioner would
make much difference. As with a man, it would all depend upon who she
was.
85. I am drawing here on the responses of women's organisations to the Law Commission's
discussion paper, Law Com. No.103.
86. SeefurtherS. Atkins and B. Hoggett, Women and the Law (1984).
